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INTRODUCTION 
 
The territorial dimension of politics has attracted growing academic interest in 
recent years. Yet, many of its epistemological assumptions and methodological 
tools are still subject to no little mystification. Theories and analyses related to 
concepts such as decentralization, ethnicity, federalism, multiculturalism or 
nationalism have frequently been limited to the discussion of the efficiency or 
inefficiency of public institutions in the provision of policies and services. Such 
partial treatment has minimized the comprehensive study of: (a) the development 
of modern states (state formation, nation-building, mass democratization); (b) the 
intergovernmental relations within the boundaries of the polity; (c) the crisis in the 
legitimacy of the political institutions of the nation-state; and (d) the impact of 
globalization in ‘post-industrial’ societies. 
 
On the functional dimension of social life, discussions of welfare development 
have repeatedly focused on the provision of policies of well-being for less-
favoured citizens, as well as with the means to achieve higher economic growth 
or to bring about income redistribution. An overriding attention in the analyses of 
contemporary welfare states has usually been geared towards the ‘autonomous’ 
action of state intervention in providing security to its citizens. The fact that state 
action in the development of welfare made concordant with modernity many 
functions which had been previously developed by families, churches, guilds and 
local communities has often been ignored.  
 
Both territoriality and welfare have too often lived separated lives. We feel that 
there is a need to explore more fully the links between studies and literature 
dealing with both fields of analysis. Generally speaking, territorial politics 
literature has tended to neglect the social dimension, while research on welfare 
has taken the nation-state for granted. This introductory chapter explores the 
relationship between welfare development and territorial politics in a theoretical 
sense, with subsequent chapters examining this relationship in specific empirical 
contexts.  
 
We consider, first, the role of the welfare state in generating and sustaining a 
sense of nationhood and national identity, particularly in countries which contain 
national minorities within their boundaries. We then consider the influence of 
state structure on welfare development. Welfare states have faced considerable 
strain in recent years, from internal social and political challenges, as well as the 
external impact of globalization. These pressures have pushed many states 
towards a retrenchment or, at least, a restructuring of their welfare systems. 
Consideration is given here to the territorial consequences such reforms may 
have. In the European Union, the autonomy and sovereignty of nation-states 
faces a challenge from the process of European integration. The impact of 
Europeanization in the welfare sphere is considered towards the end of the 
chapter, with an examination of the prospects for the development of a multi-
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tiered welfare state incorporating regional, nation-state and supranational layers 
of government.  
 
 
STATE FORMATION AND WELFARE REGIMES 
 
Inheritor of the ancient Greek concept of politeia (polity), the state in Europe 
emerged gradually, to varying degrees and in response to various dynamics, 
from around the twelfth century until the end of the eighteenth century. More 
concretely, the period 1485-1789 saw the building of most modern European 
nation-states. According to Stein Rokkan, the second phase of nation-building, 
the subsequent processes of mass politics and the construction of the welfare 
state completed the main four-phase process of political development in 
contemporary Europe (Flora et al., 1999).  
 
With the consolidation of the modern nation-state in nineteenth century Europe, 
the extension of electoral franchises, together with the economic and institutional 
advances of the Industrial Revolution, favoured the construction of social 
systems which were to find institutional expression in twentieth century welfare 
states. The lack of an historical perspective has in many cases allowed the 
confusion between the normative assessment of what a welfare state should be 
and the gradual development of European systems of social protection (Flora 
and Heidenheimer, 1981; Baldwin, 1990; Ferrera, 1998). 
 
Indeed, the delivery of comprehensive systems of social welfare necessitated 
greater regulation, standardization and redistribution by central public institutions. 
This helped to blur the boundary between the state and society, and consolidated 
the state’s political and economic expansion (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983). Thus, 
the welfare state served to ‘crystallize’ the nation-state, freezing cleavage 
structures, both functionally and territorially, in the development of the European 
state. Such a process reinforced the complex web of cultural systems, historical 
legacies, political arenas and institutional frameworks. 
 
The development of the state as a national state, or 'nation-state', gave rise to 
the idea that the territorial boundaries of the polity also represent the boundaries 
of a nation or a people. The concept of 'nation' is implicit in many of the 
characteristics of the state, including its territorial boundedness and the status of 
citizenship conferred on its members. The emotional force of nationhood, and the 
solidarity and mutual belonging it engenders, also serve political purposes. The 
idea that the state represents a people sharing a common identity and a set of 
civic values enhances its legitimacy, fosters citizens’ participation in the 
democratic process, and underpins much of the discourse used to justify public 
policy-making and governmental action. Just as appeals to a sense of 
nationhood may be made to provide moral justification for military action, a 
shared national identity may be drawn upon to justify state intervention in 
domestic spheres. For example, increases (or decreases) in redistributive 
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taxation, or legislation concerning social or moral issues, may be justified in the 
name of the national community and the values it is deemed to espouse.  
 
This is a continuous process. On the one hand, the scope of the state may be 
expanded and strengthened by justifying governmental action in the name of the 
nation. On the other hand, the strengthened apparatus of the state serves to 
reinforce both the national nature of the political community and the conception of 
nationhood it is believed to symbolize. Moreover, if the modern state is to be 
sustained as a national state and generate the consent underpinning its 
legitimate rule, political actors must engage in a continual process of nation-
building. Thus, the process of nation-building is not merely a phenomenon 
associated with the period of state formation. It is also evident, albeit often in a 
banal form (Billig, 1995), in well-established states seeking to maintain their 
legitimacy and territorial integrity in the face of internal or external challenges. 
 
While reports of the death of the nation-state (Ohmae, 1995) have been greatly 
exaggerated, it is facing a challenge to its predominance and scope from three 
distinctive sources. It is challenged from above by the forces of globalization and 
continental integration. It is challenged from below by the reassertion of territorial 
minorities demanding increased autonomy and threatening state secession. 
Finally, it is challenged internally by the advance of the market and individualized 
social relations, and by a declining confidence in and engagement with the formal 
political process (Keating, 2001: 23-4).  
 
The development of state welfare enhanced the capacity of the state to intervene 
in and shape the lives of its citizens and strengthened the networks of 
apparatuses and institutions through which conceptions of the nation could be 
constructed and communicated. The particular configuration of welfare state that 
developed in a particular state context was a historically contingent outcome of 
struggles between conflicting political objectives and goals (Titmuss, 1974: 49). 
Such outcomes reflected and subsequently shaped the set of civic values around 
which national identities coalesced.   
 
The welfare state can be understood as 'a state in which organized power is 
deliberately used (through politics and administration) in an effort to modify the 
play of market forces' (Briggs, 2000: 18). Accordingly, such a course of action is 
achieved in three distinctive ways: (i) the welfare state guarantees to its citizens a 
‘minimum income’ irrespective of the market value of their work or property; (ii) it 
minimizes insecurity by supporting individuals and families in the face of certain 
social contingencies such as ill health, unemployment and old age; and (iii) it 
provides ‘an agreed range of services’ to which all citizens are equally entitled, 
without distinction of status or class. Based upon the ideas of Karl Polanyi, Gøsta 
Esping-Andersen identified decommodification as a central feature of the welfare 
state. In contrast to the pre-welfare age, when workers survived in accordance 
with their ability to sell their labour as a commodity on the marketplace, a 
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decommodified welfare system ensures a degree of protection in the face of ill 
health, old age or unemployment (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 21-3). 
 
As well as being a system of decommodification providing protection from market 
forces, the welfare state has also restructured social relations and shaped the 
structure of society. The manner in which it does so will depend upon the system 
of stratification a particular welfare state promotes and upholds. For example, the 
openness and accessibility of the education system will shape opportunities for 
social mobilization. The extent to which social services provide access to 
childcare or contraception may influence the participation and position of women 
in the employment structure. The system of stratification developed and upheld 
by the welfare state will depend upon the ideological influences which shape it.  
 
Following the pioneering work of Richard Titmuss (1958), Esping-Andersen 
(1990; 1999) developed a model to categorize the nature of welfare regime 
types. The ‘regime approach’ posits the idea that welfare states are characterized 
by a particular constellation of economic, political and social arrangements. In 
linking together a wide range of elements that are considered to influence welfare 
outcomes, the ‘regime approach’ has proved to be very persuasive and influential 
in the comparative study of welfare states. However, on establishing patterns of 
fixed interaction, a certain assumption of continuity tends to prevail over that of 
change. As a consequence, it is implicitly assumed that a particular welfare state 
will tend to sustain interests and arrangements identified within the three main 
regime types. These are succinctly described as follows:  
 
(i) The corporatist Continental welfare regime is organized on the basis of 
occupational categories and is designed much less to reduce inequality than to 
maintain status. It is characterized by a concerted action between employers and 
trade unions, and is financed by contributions made by them. Welfare policies by 
state institutions uphold this arrangement, which is organized through social 
insurance. There is a sharp distinction between labour market ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’. The universality of coverage is therefore dependent on the 
achievement and maintenance of full employment.  
 
(ii) The liberal Anglo-Saxon regime is focused on poverty alleviation. It is financed 
by taxes and incorporates residual means-tested services and flat-rate benefits. It 
has pursued a radical shift toward market principles, involving deregulation of the 
labour market, wage flexibility and containment in social expenditure. A low level 
of decommodification of individuals implies a large measure of dependence by 
citizens on the market to ensure their primary income and social protection. 
 
(iii) The social-democratic Nordic regime is premised on the combination of 
solidaristic ideas with growth and full employment, and the minimization of family 
dependence. It is financed by taxes, characterized by the principle of universality, 
and favours public provision of free services over cash transfers. The main aim of 
this type of welfare state is to ensure the equality and homogeneity of social 
groups within an all-embracing middle class. 
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These three types of welfare regime associate a specific institutional 
configuration with a ‘founding’ doctrine: social insurance schemes with the 
protection of specific occupational categories; residual benefits with the primacy 
of the market and the need to combat poverty; and universal benefits with the 
quest for equality. They are designed to have differing impacts with respect to the 
quality of social rights, social services and the structure of the labour market. 
 
To the well-known three-fold categorization of welfare regimes, a fourth 
‘familialistic’ southern European or Mediterranean category can be identified 
(Ferrera, 1996; Moreno, 2000). In broad terms, similar socio-demographic trends, 
economic constraints and patterns of public policy can be observed in all four 
south European countries (Castles, 1998; Morlino, 1998; Guillén and Álvarez, 
2001). Table 1.1 reproduces some characteristics of the four European welfare 
regimes. 
 
 
NATION-BUILDING AND THE WELFARE STATE 
 
The existing literature recognizes the role of welfare states in generating social 
solidarity across class groups. In the 1880s, Germany was the first country to 
ever introduce compulsory social insurance, the most compelling characteristic of 
modern welfare systems.1 In Sweden, the concept of folkhem describes the 
welfare state as ‘the home for all people’. Throughout its subsequent 
development, the welfare state has socialized generations of Europeans in the 
values of equality and solidarity.  
 
Indeed, social solidarity was often considered to be an explicit aim of state 
welfare. Marshall's celebrated discussion of social citizenship rights situated 
welfare state development within the context of the evolution of citizenship.2 For 
Marshall, the recognition of social rights, including the right to a minimum 
standard of economic and social welfare and security, differed from other 
citizenship rights. By generating ‘an invasion of contract by status, the 
subordination of market price to social justice, [and] the replacement of the free 
market by the declaration of rights’, social citizenship rights were considered to 
be explicitly aimed at modifying the class structure and achieving social equality 
(Marshall, [1950] 1992: 40). 
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Table 1.1: Some characteristics of the European Welfare Regimes 
 Anglo-Saxon Continental Nordic Mediterranean 
Benefits Flat rate (low intensity) Cash (high intensity) Flat rate (high 
intensity) 
Cash (low intensity) 
Financing Taxes Payroll contributions  Taxes Mixed  
Gender Female polarization Part-time feminization Occupational specific Ambivalent familialism 
Goals Individual choice Income maintenance Network public 
services 
Resource optimization 
Ideology Citizenship Neo-corporatism Egalitarianism Social justice 
Labour Market De-regulation Insiders/outsiders High public 
employment 
Big informal economy 
Poverty Dependency culture Insertion culture Statist culture Assistance culture 
Services Residual public Social partners Comprehensive public Family support 
Source: Adapted from Moreno (2003: 276) 
 
In aspiring towards a degree of social solidarity across class groups, the welfare 
state has a legitimising function. It contributes to reinforcing the political 
legitimacy of the state in the eyes if its citizens (Pierson, 1994: 3). However, an 
inclusive welfare state nurtures social solidarity not only across class boundaries 
but across territorial boundaries as well, helping to maintain cohesion between 
distinctive regional, national and/or ethnic groups. Class identities and alliances 
forged across the state territory may thus generate feelings of solidarity and 
cohesion that minimize the significance of sub-state territorial identities. From the 
perspective of territorial politics, political legitimacy and territorial integrity often 
go hand in hand. Where a lack of political legitimacy finds expression in demands 
for territorial autonomy, and ultimately, political independence, the integrity and 
unity of the state may be challenged.  
 
Analyses of welfare state development have often been based upon the 
assumption of an all-embracing state national identity rooted in both cultural and 
civic axes. However, such an ideal type of national identity is now openly 
questioned and rather problematic. While being corroded by the forces of 
globalization, national identities are also subject to internal fragmentation and 
overlapping elements of a multiple and diverse nature (Epstein, 1978; Melucci, 
1989; Castells, 1997).  
 
Particularly in culturally heterogeneous societies, individuals are often tied to 
several cultural reference groups. This interaction results in a multiplicity of socio-
political identities, dynamic and often shared, which is not always expressed 
explicitly. In pluri-national states, which incorporate more than one national 
community within their boundaries, citizens within one part of the state territory 
may share a common identity which distinguishes them from their co-citizens. 
The degree of internal consent and dissent in such plural polities has in the 
concept of ‘dual identity’ a useful methodological tool for socio-political 
interpretations.3  
 
There is nothing inherently incompatible about dual national identities. Citizens 
may feel simultaneously Basque and Spanish, Welsh and British, or Flemish and 
Belgian, without any sense of contradiction. Sub-state identities are often 
culturally or historically-rooted, and may survive alongside a sense of 
identification with and belonging to the nation-state. The markers of such 
identities are not set in stone. They are malleable and the intensity of their 
manifestation greatly depends upon contingent circumstances (Barth, 1969, 
Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; Brass, 1991). For political actors at the state and 
the sub-state level, there is political capital in seeking to shape these identities. 
Where a people no longer identify with the political institutions governing them, 
the legitimacy of that system of government will be called into question. Political 
actors are thus engaged in shaping state and sub-state national identities to 
strengthen identification with and belonging to the communities in whose name 
their claims are made.  
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Welfare development has arguably played an important role in reinforcing 
national identities, particularly at the state level (McEwen, 2001). Ramesh Mishra 
insisted that ‘the idea of maintaining and consolidating the national community - 
economically, politically and socially - was the ideological underpinning par 
excellence of the welfare state’ (Mishra, 1999: 12). The nation-building potential 
of the welfare state is, in part, embodied in the symbolic significance of its 
institutions. Welfare institutions represent a common heritage, a symbol of 
shared risks and mutual commitment, and a common project for the future. In 
pluri-national states, this symbolism can help to underpin a sense of shared 
solidarity and collective identity throughout the state, which can sit alongside and 
be compatible with sub-state cultural or historical national identities. 
 
Welfare development simultaneously enhanced the significance of national 
institutions as the source and guarantor of social protection. By extending the 
scope of the state into the everyday lives of its citizens, the development of 
systems of welfare amplified the state's visibility in the eyes of its citizens and 
increased the relevance of political debate and political decision-making. Where 
such activity took place principally at the state level, it reinforced the centrality of 
state-wide political parties and leaders operating within national institutional 
frameworks, and ensured that control of those national institutions became an 
objective of political struggle. Within pluri-national states, this could diminish the 
significance of those parties and movements seeking to make claims on behalf of 
territorial or cultural minorities, confining such issues to the margins of political 
debate.  
 
The provision of social services can also enhance the legitimacy of the political 
institutions overseeing their development. As discussed above, welfare systems 
helped to enhance the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its citizens by 
guaranteeing them a degree of protection from the vicissitudes of the market. 
Social programmes may also enhance social and economic opportunities, 
particularly for the working and middle classes. The provision or promise of 
health care, income security, housing, and education can contribute to reinforcing 
the ties that bind citizens to the state. Where a state guarantees social protection 
and security, its citizens may be less likely to shift their loyalty to sources within 
or beyond its boundaries (McEwen, 2005).  
 
As well as generating or reinforcing a sense of community and identity which 
could supersede - or sit alongside - sub-state national identities, the development 
of state-wide systems of welfare may also have accentuated among national 
minorities the uncertainty and insecurity of greater political autonomy or 
secession from the state. The promise of social and economic security from 
within the existing state structure heightens the risk for a national minority that 
increased territorial autonomy or secession may engender a loss of the social 
protection that state welfare services deliver.  
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Some liberal theorists of nationalism have assumed that a successful welfare 
state requires a strong national identity at its base. David Miller argued that a 
shared national identity, because it embodies feelings of solidarity and mutual 
obligation among members of a national community, represents an essential pre-
requisite to the functioning of redistributive welfare systems. Without the shared 
obligations implied by a common collective identity, membership of a political 
community would be based upon rational self-interest and a relationship of strict 
reciprocity. Under such circumstances, citizens would expect to receive benefits 
in proportion to the contributions they make, thus precluding a redistribution of 
resources on the basis of need. Miller combats the idea of recognizing minority 
identities without linking them to an overarching national identification (Miller, 
1995: 71-3; Miller, 2000: 105-6). Similarly, Margaret Canovan argued that the 
sense of communal solidarity inherent in national identity explains why goods and 
possessions should be regarded as shared and defines the boundaries within 
which they should be redistributed (Canovan, 1996: 27-35).  
 
Although the welfare state was founded upon a sense of solidarity and common 
belonging, it also served to reinforce these. As Michael Keating noted, the causal 
relationship between territorial identities and the welfare state cuts both ways: 
‘Not only does a sense of common identity help sustain the values of mutual 
help, but the welfare state itself helps foster national identity and unity’ (Keating, 
2001: 40).  
 
In the context of a pluri-national state, this nation-building function of the welfare 
state has served as an instrument of territorial management, a means by which 
sub-state territorial identities could be contained within the existing state 
structure, minimising their potential threat to the state’s territorial integrity. The 
welfare state has been by no means the only tool of territorial management. 
States draw upon a range of measures to accommodate national minorities 
within the existing power structure (Keating, 1988; Rudolph and Thompson, 
1989). Nevertheless, systems of state welfare can play a significant role in 
shaping national identity and maintaining national unity.  
 
 
WELFARE DEVELOPMENT AND STATE STRUCTURE 
 
In many cases, the development of systems of state welfare imposed 
standardization and homogenization within countries that have a considerable 
degree of internal asymmetry and cultural plurality. This territorial and cultural 
heterogeneity provides fertile ground for an examination of the nation-building 
potential of the welfare state. However, it also poses limitations on such potential, 
particularly where internal sub-state territorial boundaries coincide with cultural 
boundaries. Accordingly, within-state variations should be carefully scrutinized on 
analysing the constitutional arrangements for governance and welfare provision.  
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For the purpose of analytical clarification, it is useful to discuss the concept of 
‘stateness’ in the welfare sphere (Flora, 1986/87). In broad terms, it has been 
generally assumed that the processes of growing étatisation, bureaucratization 
and judicialization of welfare provision would result in the centralization, not only 
of political institutions, but also of policy-making and public regulation.  
 
In the first place, it should be noted that stateness feeds on the very concept of 
the state, which is by no means an unambiguous concept. Traditionally, the state 
has been regarded by democratic liberalism as a ‘neutral’ network of political 
institutions within spatial boundaries. Accordingly, the extent of state intervention 
in the citizens’ community should be restricted and social conflicts would be 
resolved by the laissez-faire of market forces. Utilitarian liberalism, in line with the 
concept of community-nation put forward by Jeremy Bentham (1843), proposed a 
growing degree of stateness to provide a minimum of social assistance. A 
corporatist variant of liberal thought has sought to emphasize the role of 
intermediate corporatist structures in order to achieve social cohesion of the body 
politic, and to integrate them into the general organization of the state. For 
Marxism and social democracy, the state is ‘operational’ rather than ‘neutral'. It 
can be seized upon to correct market failures and, eventually, to transform the 
capitalist mode of production into a socialist one on either a radical (the former) 
or a gradual (the latter) basis. State intervention is translated into a wholehearted 
commitment to economic planning monitored primarily by central institutions.  
 
Second, stateness may be conceived of as a reflection of the degree of 
penetration of public institutions into the sphere of welfare, displacing non-state 
institutions such as the church and other intermediary associations of civil 
society. Such a penetration has frequently been conceptualized as a mere 
process of centralization. However, the adoption of legitimate constitutions or 
legal frameworks for the output of public goods has allowed the development of 
different systems of welfare provision, not always top-down or vertically planned 
(Toft, 1996). Federations and federal-like systems provide good examples of both 
shared and self-rule based upon wide constitutional agreements among layers of 
government and constituent territorial units (Elazar, 1991; Watts, 1994; Linz, 
1997; Obinger et al., 2005).  
 
Third, the category of stateness also makes reference to the degree of autonomy 
of state officials in decision-making and in the implementation of public polices 
and regulations. Note, however, that such penetration applies to all layers of 
government - central, regional and local - not only as regards direct intervention 
but also statutory frameworks. In line with the traditional Jacobin tenets, there 
has been a tendency to make synonymous both central government and state 
institutions (administrative, legal and political). Even considering the executive 
dimension of state institutions, it cannot be said that state officials and 
bureaucrats exercize their instrumental rationality strictly according to the 
instructions and orders of central loci of policy-making. The public choices of 
decision-makers, and in particular the so-called ‘street-level’ bureaucrats, have 
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often given priority to maximising tenure of office and budgetary resources in all 
governmental tiers of state provision. Such a reality has objectively put limits on 
central and hierarchical policy-making even in unitary states. 
 
As already discussed, the historical analysis of both state formation and nation-
building is central to understanding the nature of the welfare system in any given 
context. The changing patterns and diverse outcomes of the interplay between 
state and civil society should be examined not only from the viewpoint of 
economic structuring, but also from the perspective of ideas, interests, institutions 
and actors within modern state arenas. Social solidarity among the political units 
is inextricably linked to the nature of the cultural and territorial conflicts in the 
processes of industrialization, urbanization and social communication within 
contemporary mass society (Tocqueville, 1954; Deutsch, 1966; Giner, 1976). 
 
 
State Welfare and Decentralization 
 
Spatial cleavages and the quest for decentralization have often been examined 
as responses to sub-state claims for subsidiarity and democratic accountability. 
However, the political salience of sub-state regions and regional policy-making in 
the social policy realm has drawn attention to the growing intersection between 
these fields of research. Not so long ago, ideas, interests and institutions related 
to welfare and spatial developments were frequently regarded as contradictory or 
even incompatible with each other. Regional actors have now gained relevance 
not only concerning culture and identity politics. They are increasingly regarded 
as optimal welfare providers as a result of the interaction of the processes of 
bottom-up globalization and the top-down devolution of powers (Moreno, 2003).  
 
In historical terms, the quest for decentralization has sought to accommodate a 
response to the stimuli of the diversity within the modern nation-state. In the 
majority of cases, the modern state comprises territorial communities and groups 
with differences of language, history or traditions (Connor, 1994).4 As a result of 
within-state variations, often reflected in the party system, channels of elite 
representation or interest group articulation, decentralization has become a major 
embedding factor in contemporary political life. 
 
A broad definition of decentralization involves the establishment of institutions in 
areas which are the result of the division of the territory of the state. It can be 
subdivided into two general types: (i) political decentralization, and (ii) 
administrative de-concentration. The former entails the exercize of autonomous 
decision-making powers by sub-state governments, elected by and 
democratically accountable to the citizens under their jurisdiction. The latter 
refers to the implementation of decisions at a sub-state level by non-
departmental governmental5 bodies appointed by the central government. 
However, further precision is required on a case-by-case basis as 
decentralization may imply the transferring of responsibilities for both policy-
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making and delivery; while in other cases, policy parameters may continue to be 
set centrally, with decentralization limited to service delivery. 
 
In some cases, as in France, decentralization is a top-down initiative aimed at 
increasing governmental efficiency and offloading the day-to-day responsibility 
for administering welfare from the central to the local level. In other cases, 
political decentralization was conceded in response to an expressed desire for 
self-government on the part of sub-state nations or regions. In such cases, the 
old constitutional order had become untenable, threatening the legitimacy of the 
state. Political autonomy is thus a means of generating renewed legitimacy and 
quelling challenges to the state's territorial integrity. Political decentralization may 
also have a functional goal from the sub-state perspective. Arguments for greater 
involvement in welfare development on the part of local and regional layers of 
government concern the maximization of available information for policy-makers, 
and a better ‘tailoring’ of social programmes according to local needs and 
citizens’ expectations. Critics draw attention, however, to the fact than an 
excessive autonomy of the richer regions would be to the detriment of the poorer 
ones. Inequalities in welfare provision would increase, unless social rights and 
entitlements are legally guaranteed and can be claimed before the courts.  
 
Where welfare systems developed within an already decentralized structure, this 
often conditioned the pace and scope of welfare development, and limited the 
extent to which state welfare could effectively contribute to nation-building. On 
the other hand, decentralized state structures sometimes facilitated welfare 
development, with sub-state units acting as a locus of policy experimentation and 
a vehicle for change at the national level. For example, the post-war development 
of the Canadian welfare system was hampered by provincial opposition from the 
governments of Quebec and Ontario, but it was also pioneered by innovative 
social policies in the province of Saskatchewan (see Béland and Lecours in this 
volume).  
 
Political decentralization introduced within established welfare democracies may 
also shape the nature of the welfare state. Sub-state autonomy over welfare 
legislation can lead to policy divergence, and the development of distinctive and 
diverse welfare regimes within the boundaries of a single state. Some degree of 
policy divergence is an inevitable consequence of political decentralization, 
particularly where this has emerged in response to self-government demands. 
However, in the context of welfare, policy divergence has the potential to 
undermine inter-regional solidarity where it implies that citizens in different 
regions of the same state do not enjoy access to similar services, or recognition 
of the same social rights and entitlements. Although control over social insurance 
has tended to rest with central government, sub-state political autonomy has 
involved the decentralization of substantial areas of the welfare state, particularly 
within the arena of personal social services. Conversely, the decentralization of 
the welfare state can stimulate policy innovation, with a ‘demonstration effect’ 
that minimizes the detrimental consequences for state-national solidarity. For 
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example, when the Basque government launched a minimum income 
programme, (Plan de Lucha contra la Pobreza), it sparked the other Spanish 
Comunidades Autónomas into establishing similar programmes, in a form of 
‘competitive state-building’ (Guillén, 1996; Arriba and Moreno, 2004).  
 
 
State Structure and Welfare Provision 
 
The extent to which the welfare state can perform a successful nation-building 
function is thus dependent upon the structure of the state in which it has evolved. 
Table 1.2 sets out a typology of five national and constitutional structures in 
which welfare provision has taken shape. Examples of the various types included 
in the table are provided by the case studies included in this book. Such 
examples do not exhaust the possible state forms but they represent the main 
developments in territorial accommodation in modern times: 
 
(1) Uni-national state, unitary structure: Uni-national states have no significant 
territorial cleavages and no minorities challenging the state's claim to represent a 
national community. Consequently, they face little or no internal challenges to 
their territorial legitimacy. Where such states have a unitary structure, they are 
likely to be highly centralized, with a central authority that enjoys considerable 
political and economic dominance. All institutions will fall under its control and 
public policies will be standardized and uniformly administered throughout the 
state. Majority state nationalism of the type inaugurated in France after the 1789 
Revolution has had wide-range influence in the modern process of nation-
building all over the world. French Jacobins succeeded in making equivalent the 
concepts of reason and homogeneity. This form of nationalism aimed at 
integrating an ethnically heterogeneous society, as was nineteenth century 
France. As a result of Jacobinism, the French nation-state came to be composed 
exclusively of individuals and not of ethnoterritorial communities (such as 
Alsatian, Breton, Catalan, Corsican, Gaul, Occitanian or Basque).6  
 
 
 
 7
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2: A Typology of National and State structures 
 Union state Unitary state Decentralized/ 
Federal state 
Uni-national state    
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Norway 
Sweden  
 
 
Germany (post-
1949) 
Pluri-national 
state 
 
Spain (dated 
1485) 
UK (dated 1707) 
 
 
 
Belgium (1831) 
Italy (1870) 
 
Canada 
Belgium (post-
1994) 
Italy (post-1948) 
Spain (post-1978) 
UK ( post-1999) 
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(2) Uni-national state, decentralized/federal structure: A distinction between 
organic - or integrative - federal states and mechanical - or devolutionary - 
federal states can be drawn. In the first type, federalism emerges from an 
aggregation from below as a result of the association of distinctive territories. In 
the second, federalism is promoted from above by constitutional means with the 
aim of devolving power. Uni-national states which lack significant sub-state 
national cleavages are more likely to conform to the second type. The 
dominance of the centre, and the lack of a territorial challenge to the state's 
political legitimacy from a national minority, minimizes the degree to which 
federal structures will engender intergovernmental tension or constrain political 
change. The German federation is a prime example of what has been 
characterized as ‘cooperative federalism’.7 This federal organization provides 
the regions (Länder) with a strong role in deciding upon and in implementing 
federal legislation. As well, the Länder can exercize their power through the 
Federal Council (Bundesrat), an upper chamber or senate composed of 
representatives of the Land governments, and which have considerable 
influence - potentially the power of veto - on a wide range of legislation, 
particularly in welfare matters. 
 
(3) Pluri-national states, unitary structure: Pluri-national states include more 
than one national community within their boundaries. In some cases, as in 
Belgium (1831) or Italy (1870), the initial process of state formation and nation-
building adopted a highly unitary and centralized form. Subsequent territorial 
accommodation and the quest for home rule by the constituent nations and 
regions within the unitary structure paved the way for decentralization and/or 
federalization. After a long historical process of gradual reforms, the Belgian 
unitary state transformed itself into a federal state in 1993.8 Belgium is now one 
of the European countries with the most comprehensive fiscal autonomy for 
their federated units. In the case of Italy, a unitary state was the original form 
adopted after the Risorgimento under the Savoy dystany.9 During the initial 
phase of Italy’s state formation, the new national identity was strong and placed 
itself above the many sub-state identities which had survived for centuries. The 
Fascist regime (1922-1943) enforced national homogeneity, but in 1948, the 
democratic constitution recognized the regions as political bodies with 
administrative and legislative powers. In 2004, the Senate first voted for a 
constitutional reform to transform itself into a ‘Federal Chamber’ and to devolve 
to the regions full legislative powers concerning education, health and local 
police. 
 
(4) Pluri-national states, union structure: Union states are largely centralized 
politically. However, some sub-state or minority nations may have retained 
elements of pre-union identity and institutional autonomy (Rokkan and Urwin, 
1982: 11; Moreno, 1986). These boundaries are not necessarily discrete and 
often overlap. For example, the boundaries of the Scottish nation lie within the 
British nation, while the Catalan nation is embedded within the Spanish nation. 
The pluri-national character of such states may or may not be recognized. In 
some cases, national minorities may be granted enhanced representation in 
central political or legal institutions, or given symbolic recognition in political 
discourse. In union states, state-wide institutions, parties and policy networks 
often represent forces of integration which can contain territorial distinctiveness 
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and ensure that its expression is channelled in apolitical ways. The United 
Kingdom represented a good example. Politically centralized for much of its 
history, its pluri-national character has long been recognized in the institutions 
of civil society and public administration, including the Scottish and Welsh 
Offices, the church and (in Scotland) the legal system (Brown, et al., 1998). 
Beyond elite institutions, distinctive national identities have also found popular 
expression, with the distinctive nations competing separately in football, rugby 
and other sports (Brand, 1978).  
 
(5) Pluri-national states, decentralized/federal structure: The pluri-national 
character of a state may be more politically significant in states which have a 
highly decentralized or federal structure. Politically decentralized and federal 
states are characterized by a set of institutional arrangements that divide power 
between the centre and some or all regions. In decentralized systems, power 
has usually been devolved from the centre to the regional level. Federal states, 
by contrast, are characterized by a more explicit division of sovereignty between 
different levels of the state, with each unit recognized as sovereign within its 
areas of jurisdiction. Where territorial units coincide with sub-state national, 
linguistic or cultural boundaries, their political significance is likely to be 
reinforced. Anthony Smith insisted that in multi-ethnic federations, where 
provincial and ‘ethnic’ boundaries coincide, ‘the politics of nationalism is rarely 
far removed from the arena of federal politics, feeding into a set of grievances 
which in one form or another have the potential to mobilize individuals behind 
calls for the territorial redistribution of power, including independence’ (Smith, 
1995: 10). However, the boundaries of the respective national communities may 
not match the boundaries of the sub-state units, creating additional tensions. 
For example, the prevalent view of Canada promoted in Quebec has been of 
two nations: Quebec and 'English Canada'. By contrast, the other nine 
provinces neither represent a political unit, nor do they conceive of themselves 
as representing a distinctive national community.  
 
In unitary and, to a lesser extent, union states, the centralization of political 
institutions enhanced the capacity of the centre to command control over the 
development of social services, and gain recognition as the source and 
guarantor of social and economic security. In highly decentralized or federal 
states, by contrast, the development of state welfare has often been shared 
between the centre and the sub-state level, thus constraining the ‘command-
and-control’ efforts by the central state to develop uniform state-wide social 
services and national institutions.   
 
The nation-building function of the welfare state has been particularly hampered 
where the pluri-national character of the state is reflected in multi-level 
government. Firstly, with control over the development of their welfare regimes, 
sub-state governments may be in a position to preside over the development of 
distinctive welfare institutions which can act as symbols embodying the sub-
state community’s solidarity and shared sense of belonging together. Secondly, 
sub-state governments may come to be regarded as the providers and 
guarantors of the social well-being of the people they represent, and as such, 
become the focus of the people's loyalty and the focal point for their policy 
demands. Thirdly, they may be perceived as the new centre of political 
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decision-making for those lobbying and competing over the distribution of 
resources, thus heightening the significance of sub-state political parties and 
institutions.  
 
There is no inherent conflict between state and sub-state governments over the 
process of welfare development. Indeed, as Luis Moreno insisted, welfare state 
expansion should not only be understood in the context of a centralized state 
structure. Examining the Spanish case, he noted the growth of ‘institutional 
stateness’, defined as state penetration of the welfare sphere, within the context 
of a decentralized political structure in which the Spanish Autonomous 
Communities have taken a lead role in welfare development (Moreno, 2001: 
110-12). However, there is a greater potential for conflict in politically 
decentralized or federal states where the constitutionally defined units of 
government are reflections of distinctive national units, and where this political 
and national structure is reflected in the decentralization or ‘bifurcation’ of the 
political party system, as in parts of Canada and Spain. Keith Banting, one of 
the few observers to explore the territorial implications of welfare development, 
noted the potential of the welfare state in territorially heterogeneous countries to 
act as an instrument of nation-building at the state and the sub-state level, 
depending upon the locus of social policy control. Where power rests with the 
central government, social policy can be utilised to mediate regional conflicts 
and reinforce national integration, strengthening the authority and legitimacy of 
the state in the face of challenges from territorial minorities. Conversely, where 
social programmes are developed and managed at the sub-state level, they can 
strengthen regional cultures and enhance the significance of regional 
governments in the everyday lives of their citizens (Banting, 1995: 270-1). This 
may help to explain why control over social policy is frequently an issue of 
intergovernmental tensions between state and sub-state governments in pluri-
national, decentralized states. 
 
 
WELFARE RESTRUCTURING AND TERRITORIAL POLITICS 
 
During the trentes glorieuses, or ‘Golden Age’, of welfare capitalism (1945-75), 
West European systems of social protection were based upon the assumption 
of full employment and on the complementary role developed by the family and, 
in particular, of women’s unpaid work within households (Lewis, 1997, 2001). A 
combination of social policies, Keynesianism, Taylorism and female segregation 
facilitated a sustained economic growth and the generalization of a type of 
‘affluent worker’. The effects of the oil crises in 1973-74 and 1978-79 revealed 
the increasing openness and interdependence of advanced capitalist 
economies, and altered a scenario of prosperity and abundant stable male 
employment. Nevertheless, the ‘Golden Age’ evolved into a ‘Silver Age’ of the 
welfare state, revealing limitations but also a high degree of resilience in 
resisting pressures of a diverse nature (Taylor-Gooby, 2002).  
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, a neo-liberal ideological offensive challenged the 
tenets and legitimacy upon which welfare states had previously developed. Its 
discourse elaborated on the effects of economic globalization and industrial 
transformations on national labour markets. In parallel, deep structural 
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modifications had taken place as a consequence of the ageing of the population 
and the increasing participation of women in the formal labour market. In sum, 
fiscal crises and the erosion of the ideological consensus which gave way to the 
‘mid-century compromise’10 had conditioned the recasting of welfare states in 
Europe (Ferrera and Rhodes, 2000).  
 
Although references to the 'Golden Age' of welfare are often overstated, there is 
a widespread belief that the welfare state in many advanced industrial 
democracies has come under pressure in the last two decades. The state's 
capacity and will to maintain comprehensive systems of welfare has faced 
challenges on a number fronts, leading to varying degrees of welfare 
retrenchment. The politics of welfare retrenchment have translated in most 
cases into a common approach for the containment of public expenditure, 
although a variety of pressures have ensured that social spending as a share of 
GDP has maintained high levels during the last decades in most advanced 
welfare states. Many states have sought to trim welfare entitlements and 
introduce selectivity and targeting in welfare provision. Some responsibility for 
social welfare has been transferred to the individual, the family and to civil 
society, as the role of the state in direct welfare service delivery has diminished. 
Accordingly, ‘throughout Europe, the dominant theme in contemporary social 
policy is the retreat of the welfare state’ (Bonoli et al., 2000: 1).  
 
 
The Retrenchment of the Welfare State 
 
Four sources of the pressures that have fostered welfare retrenchment can be 
identified: demographic pressures; changing attitudes towards taxation; 
neoliberalism; and globalization. 
 
First, demographic indicators, particularly high unemployment, low fertility and 
an ageing population, suggest long-term pressures upon the maintenance of 
welfare regimes, as proportionately fewer workers are left to carry the burden of 
financing an increasingly costly welfare system. Coupled with declining 
economic growth and the restricted scope for revenue-raising, this has given 
rise to a prevailing view among governments across the political spectrum that 
the welfare state has to be significantly reformed if it is to remain viable (Bonoli, 
et al., 2000; Kuhnle, 2000; Esping-Andersen, et al., 2002; Pierson, 2001; 
Taylor-Gooby, 2004). 
 
Second, there is now a belief among governments that their citizens are no 
longer willing to pay more taxes or higher contributions to finance welfare 
expenditure. The logic of such fears tends toward expenditure restraint. There is 
little evidence in surveys of opinion of a shift away from support for an 
interventionist welfare state. In particular, support remains high for increased 
social spending on health care and programmes, including pensions, which 
contribute towards care for the elderly. However, this often coincides with 
support for tax cuts for lower and middle income earners, creating considerable 
dilemmas for policy-makers left trying to ‘square the welfare circle’ (George and 
Taylor-Gooby, 1996).  
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Third, the emergence of neoliberalism posed a direct challenge to the 
Keynesian welfare state. From the perspective of the New Right, the Keynesian 
welfare state became unsustainable as it lacked the capacity to carry out the 
responsibilities it had acquired and the expectations it had raised. Whereas 
social democrats maintained that social rights enabled the working class to 
acquire full and equal citizenship status, neo-liberals argued that the welfare 
state had made the poor dependent upon the state without enhancing their 
opportunities. In place of benefits or ‘state hand-outs’, which were deemed to 
have engendered a ‘dependency culture’, neoliberals advocated free enterprise, 
individual responsibility and self-reliance (King, 1987; Hoover and Plant, 1989).  
 
Neo-liberalism has enjoyed much greater influence in Anglo-Saxon countries 
than in Scandinavia or continental Europe, and even within the Anglo-Saxon 
world, the degree to which the welfare state has actually been ‘rolled back’ is 
contested. As Paul Pierson observed, the politics of welfare retrenchment is 
distinct from the politics of expansion, not least because the large-scale social 
programmes set up in the period of expansion are now central features of the 
political landscape, with organizational interests and popular support that render 
retrenchment policies politically costly (Pierson, 1994: 8-31). Nevertheless, the 
cumulative effect of retrenchment measures can be significant, and even cuts at 
the margins can have a profound impact upon sections of the population, often 
the most vulnerable.  
 
Fourth, the globalization and internationalization of trade have decisively 
affected the economy world-wide, bringing about a deep restructuring of 
contemporary capitalism (Hirst and Thompson, 1999; Held and McGrew, 2000). 
Financial globalization has all but terminated the closed national economies 
upon which the Keynesian welfare state depended. A hegemonic ideology 
supporting the necessity and inevitability of the free movement of capital and 
goods helped to create the institutional conditions which then contributed to 
making the free movement of capital and goods a reality. Frances Piven (1995) 
suggested that this was a self-fulfilling prophecy. The inter-related objectives of 
full employment, progressive taxation and high levels of public expenditure 
characteristic of the period of post-war welfare expansion have been largely 
abandoned as policy goals (Mishra, 1999), while the free movement of capital 
has restricted the degree to which the state can implement ‘market-correcting’ 
policies (Rhodes and Mény, 1998).  
 
National governments of the advanced welfare democracies still maintain their 
nominal sovereignty empowering them to negotiate new economic frameworks. 
At the same time they can also bargain with multinational corporations. 
However, their economic manoeuvrability to put forward innovative polices 
outside global demands has become limited in recent decades (Camilleri and 
Falk, 1992; Schmidt, 1995). Failure of programmes for indicative planning 
implemented by the first Mitterrand Government in the early 1980s illustrated 
the ‘persuasiveness’ of the external constraints posed on national sovereignty in 
the most étatiste country in Europe. 
 
The scale of the challenge posed by globalization, and the direction in which it 
is affecting welfare states, is open to debate. For some authors, globalization 
 13
not only constrains welfare state expansion but it will inevitably induce further 
retrenchment as states seek to reduce public expenditure and promote market 
flexibility (Ohmae, 1995; Cerny, 1990; Scharpf, 2000). For others, globalization 
may be ‘beneficial’ for the welfare state and encourage further welfare 
development. As citizens are becoming increasingly exposed to new risks, the 
need and demands for additional welfare provision will increase (Katzenstein 
1985; Garret 1998; Leibfried and Rieger, 1998: Taylor-Gooby, 2004).11 
 
The configuration of the welfare state in a particular national context serves to 
‘filter’ common socio-economic challenges and determine the direction that 
welfare reform will take. Although all welfare states are facing similar pressures 
as a result of globalization, how they respond to these pressures depends upon 
the pre-existing institutional nature of their welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 
1996; Ferrera, 1998; Rhodes, 1998). The impact of globalization on the welfare 
state will also be mediated by politics. Indeed, some have argued that the 
globalization discourse is often used as a tool for those seeking to modify pacts 
of solidarity at the national level (Deacon, 2001; Palier and Sykes 2001; Taylor-
Gooby, 2001). 
 
Thus, the pressures upon the welfare state are many, varied and often 
contradictory. Welfare states and related social programmes remain popular but 
sections of voters seem hesitant to further contribute their taxes to pay for them. 
Welfare states thus often show greater resistance to change as their ‘path 
dependency’ trajectories cannot easily be re-routed even by transnational 
pressures (Pierson, 1998). Nevertheless, the restructuring and retrenchment of 
welfare can have an impact upon territorial politics, and upon the capacity of the 
state to effectively contain territorial identities effectively. 
 
 
The Territorial Consequences of Retrenchment 
 
Where the welfare state helped to maintain national unity and inter-regional 
solidarity, we might expect that its retrenchment would undermine that solidarity 
and threaten the political and territorial legitimacy of the state. This is especially 
problematic when the legitimacy of the state is questioned by citizens within a 
particular region or nation who share a collective identity that distinguishes them 
from the rest of their co-citizens, as it increases the potential for a territorial 
rather than a class response to welfare restructuring. Welfare regime change 
may thus have consequences for the territorial integrity of the state, serving to 
politicize sub-state territorial identity in the demand for greater self-government, 
while undermining the capacity of the state to respond to such challenges. 
 
Where welfare state institutions helped to reinforce national symbols, the 
weakening of these institutions may have a corresponding effect on the 
symbolic significance of the nation. Retrenchment pressures, as a result of the 
stresses and demands identified above, also diminish the scope for 
decommodification and protection from market forces. The consequences for 
territorial politics may be particularly significant in pluri-national and 
decentralized states. If the state can no longer convincingly act as the guarantor 
of social and political rights to national minorities who already share a strong 
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sense of identity, then part of the rationale for their continued attachment to the 
larger unit - the assurance of social and economic security - may be diluted.  
 
A weakened central state, in the face of globalization pressures, also diminishes 
the importance of representation within, and access to, central state institutions. 
Where access to and control over the centre and its resources becomes less 
critical, state-wide political parties and movements may have greater difficulty 
containing sub-state national identities and corresponding territorial demands. 
This leaves space for the emergence of minority nationalist parties, and 
increases the likelihood that they may have an electoral impact. When 
nationalist parties voicing territorial demands enjoy electoral success, state-
wide political parties are usually persuaded to turn their attention to finding new 
ways to accommodate national minorities through policy concessions or 
promises of autonomy.  
 
From the perspective of a national minority, where the state can no longer 
guarantee protection from market forces, or resources to meet social and 
economic needs, the national state as a focus of identity and loyalty may be 
weakened. Increased political autonomy, especially political secession, is 
inevitably something of a leap in the dark. The uncertainty surrounding such 
constitutional change is often highlighted, perhaps exaggerated, by its 
opponents to heighten anxieties that social programmes and security offered by 
the existing state may no longer be affordable (among other fears, such as 
capital flight, for instance). However, where the existing state retreats from 
welfare provision, the risks that political autonomy would result in the sub-state 
community carrying heavy losses in terms of health care, pensions, and other 
benefits becomes less significant. Under these circumstances, territorial 
minorities may come to the conclusion that they have little to lose from greater 
political autonomy or, ultimately, independence from the state. Indeed, some 
sub-state communities have sought to re-create citizenship by claiming 
reinforced membership ties of social inclusion which the traditional sovereign 
state can no longer uphold in a centralized manner. Political actors at the sub-
state level have claimed that social solidarity may enjoy a high degree of 
legitimacy in smaller territories, where a strong sense of common identity and a 
mutual sense of belonging is shared, and where an ‘umbrella’ of non-
discriminatory constitutional provisions of an egalitarian nature is guaranteed 
(Moreno, 1999).  
 
Inasmuch as globalization limits the autonomy of the national state, it has also 
limited its capacity to accommodate territorial minorities within existing political 
and institutional structures. Increasingly, sub-state governments and local 
authorities do not require the rationalising intervention of central bureaucracies 
and elites, and can activate policies of industrial relocation or attraction of 
foreign capitals without the role of intermediaries at the state’s centre. By 
means of local incentives, urban re-development plans, or favouring corporatist 
agreements with trade unions and industrialists, regional governments and 
metropolitan authorities can have direct negotiations with the transnational 
corporations involved (Rhodes, 1996; Moreno, 2003). 
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However, sub-state governments do not exist in isolation from the new 
international order. They are subject to the same socio-demographic pressures 
and necessity of a greater inter-connectedness with institutions and actors 
beyond their boundaries (Jones, 1995). This may constrain their capacity to 
generate social solidarity and reinforce territorial loyalties through the 
distribution of social transfers and services. Critics of the de-structuring of the 
old order have suggested that globalization, decentralization and the increasing 
role of sub-state governments may bring about two major drawbacks to welfare 
development:  
 
(a) Sub-state governments may be more sensitive to pressures from the 
business community for increased flexibility, lower taxation and lower public 
spending. Individually, sub-state communities appear more vulnerable to the 
threat of disinvestments in an era where capital is increasingly mobile, and 
‘when even a single corporate relocation can devastate an entire community’ 
(Piven, 1995: 114).  
 
(b) Sub-state governments may be tempted in an increasingly competitive 
international arena to offer ‘too’ generous conditions for capital investments or 
industrial relocations. By engaging themselves in a ‘race to the bottom’, social 
rights may be restricted, making welfare retrenchment inevitable. Viewed from 
this angle, decentralization would render social citizenship rights somewhat 
precarious.  
 
According to functional theories, the nation-state governments should take on 
redistribution while sub-state administrations should be in charge of 
developmental functions. However, no consistent empirical findings lend 
support for a ‘positive sum’ arrangement with the allocation of the function of 
redistribution to the national level and those concerning the operationalization of 
welfare policies to the regional level.12 Politicians in either national or sub-state 
governments make choices so as to maximize their own benefits. This fact 
greatly explains why members of both layers of government are reluctant to tax 
their constituents in order to allow less-favoured citizens to prosper, something 
which makes redistribution difficult (Petersen, 1995).  
 
Both politicians and decision-makers at state and sub-state levels may become 
‘credit-claimers’ or ‘blame-avoiders’, depending upon their situational logic and 
political strategies. Furthermore, what is economically efficient may not be 
politically possible or sustainable.13 Thus, political impacts on national and 
regional bureaucracies in the implementation process must be taken into 
account. Likewise, national and regional politicians seek credit for their activities 
and they do so regardless of economic and rational arguments. 
 
As already stated, the form of decentralization is an important area for analysis 
in assessing social policy outcomes. Some findings point to the fact that 
countries in which responsibility for spending is decentralized, but responsibility 
for revenue-raising is centralized, tend to spend more than other countries, 
other things being equal. By contrast, in countries where both revenue-raising 
and welfare spending are decentralized, expenditure levels appear lower 
(Rodden, 2003).  
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Concerns over the ‘race to the bottom’ or, conversely, of sub-state communities 
(länder, provinces, regioni, etc.) becoming welfare ‘magnets’, have generally 
been overstated. While politicians may choose to believe that generous benefits 
will attract welfare beneficiaries from other sub-state territories, there is little 
evidence to support such claims. Even in a federal country such as the USA - 
where there is a much greater geographical mobility than in Europe - there is 
little empirical evidence to suggest that  ‘voting with their feet’ actually takes 
place (Weissert and Weissert, 2002; Berry et al., 2003). Given the importance 
of this logic on the normative defence of redistribution as a state-level function, 
perhaps this long-standing view should be revisited. 
 
The debate on whether decentralization constrains redistribution is an 
unfinished one. There is a large cross-national literature which uses multi-
variate analysis to understand the factors that influence levels of social 
spending (Hicks and Swank, 1992; Huber and Stephens, 2001). This literature 
has a long-standing trajectory (Cameron, 1978), and has regularly concluded 
that federalism and/or decentralization constrains the expansion of the welfare 
state. Further arguments point to the contention that it can have more powerful 
negative effects than any other institutional variable; greater than factors such 
as the level of corporatism in decision-making, the nature of the electoral 
system or a presidential system of government (Swank, 2002). 
 
In addition to the structure of the state, redistribution may also be affected by 
the state's ethnic composition. It has been argued that the degree of 
redistribution is more limited in countries which are ethnically heterogeneous or 
that have high levels of immigration. Some have suggested that public policies 
designed to recognize and accommodate internal diversity are detrimental to 
the robustness of the welfare state, with numerous consequences. They may 
have: a crowding-out effect, diverting energy, money and time from 
redistribution to recognition; a corroding effect, eroding trust and solidarity 
amongst citizens; or a misdiagnosis effect, with ‘culturalist’ solutions shifting 
attention from the 'real problem' of class inequalities (for an analysis of this 
debate, see Banting and Kymlicka, 2003). In responding to such charges, Keith 
Banting and Will Kymlicka argued that the linkage between welfare 
retrenchment and policies of accommodation and recognition is not empirically 
sustained. In fact, they could find no consistent relationship between the 
adoption of multiculturalism policies and the erosion of the welfare state. 
Indeed, countries that have implemented far-reaching policies of 
accommodation and recognition, such as Canada and Australia, tend to 
demonstrate a greater positive correlation between social spending and 
redistribution (ibid.)  
 
The possible exacerbation of inter-regional inequalities, as illustrated above in 
the discussion of the ‘welfare tourism’ argument, needs a more detailed 
qualification not only from the economic, social and political perspectives, but 
also from a cultural viewpoint. In the case of the European ‘old continent’, social 
bonds, kin and networks of friends have a considerable influence in people’s 
attachment to their territorial contexts. As a deterrence to ‘welfare tourism’, 
cultural factors include not only linguistic barriers and differences in customs 
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and habits, but also a more accessible path towards social insertion. In fact, 
territorial identities at regional and local level can provide better means of 
insertion for the poor and excluded. In parallel, there is also little evidence to 
suggest that globalizing trends have blurred local markers of identity and 
belonging. If anything, collective attachments to supranational levels of civic 
membership and institutional development have gone hand in hand with a 
strengthening of local culture and territorial identities at the regional level, 
noticeably in Europe. As a result, citizens in advanced industrial democracies 
seem to reconcile supranational, state and local identities, which both majority 
(state) and minority (stateless) nationalisms often tend to polarize in a 
conflicting manner. Thus, the emphasis upon territorial identities and local milieus 
for political action ought not to be placed merely on distinctiveness, but also on 
those relationships of interaction, congruence, and growing intergovernmental co-
operation (Moreno, 2005). 
 
 
EUROPEANIZATION AND WELFARE 
 
The unfolding of structures of governance at a supranational European level is 
taking place by means of formalizing interactions between the members of the 
European Union. These governmental interactions affect actors and policy 
networks traditionally confined to operating in nation-state arenas. As a multi-
level political framework, the European Union is a compound of policy 
processes, and Europeanization implies that national, regional and local policies 
are to be shaped by considerations beyond the mere centrality of the member 
states. 
 
Supra-national processes such as Europeanization seek to accommodate long-
standing national traditions with a common political will expressed by countries 
sharing a somewhat similar historical development and embracing values of 
democracy and human rights of an egalitarian nature. Europeanization is 
developing within a framework of system-values that translates into a gradual 
process of internal restructuring and institutional boundary-building. It is hardly 
surprising, therefore, that many processes of political decentralization within 
contemporary European pluri-national states have gained momentum in parallel 
with the development of Europeanization. However, the concept of 
Europeanization is ambiguous and subject to various degrees of understanding 
and interpretation.14 A constitution of a United States of Europe cannot be 
regarded as the compelling end-result of the process of Europeanization. The 
neo-functionalist school of thought has generally adopted the view that 
universal progress requires a kind of integration, which is made equal to cultural 
assimilation and single identity formation, along the lines of the American 
‘melting-pot’ experience. Often this approach is coupled with the view that 
‘command-and-control’ policy provision is quintessential for securing organized 
solidarity and the maintenance of redistributive welfare. Alternatively, pluralists 
envisage that European rules can only be achieved and successfully 
accommodated by taking into account both history and cultural diversity within 
the mosaic of peoples in the old continent. In both approaches, the principles of 
democratic accountability and territorial subsidiarity are crucial, although not 
always shared to the same degree and scope. 
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The difficulties faced by EU national governments in approving the European 
Constitution in 2004 seem to corroborate the intergovernmentalist theory that 
the EU is little more than a forum for bargaining between the member states, 
and that national governments are the paramount political actors in the process 
of Europeanization. However, such a state-centric view must be subject to 
several qualifications: (i) short-term interests put forward by the national 
governments often have long-term unintended and unanticipated institutional 
consequences; (ii) the density of EU policy-making and the partial autonomy of 
EU institutions allow for decisions to expand beyond the member states’ control; 
and (iii) institutional inertia, sunk costs and the rising costs of ‘non-Europe’ 
greatly reduce the overriding capacity of national governments to reverse the 
process of Europeanization (Pierson, 1996). 
 
At the sub-state level, European territories seem to follow a pattern of recreating 
those political communities which flourished in the age prior to the new world 
discoveries (for example, Italian city-states, Hanseatic League, principalities). 
However, and in contrast with the Renaissance period, there is now a common 
institutional tie inherent in the process of European integration. Although in a 
rather loose and gradual manner, a majority of the EU peoples have 
internalized European institutions as a common political frame of reference. The 
European Court of Justice, the Schengen Agreement and the establishment of 
Economic and Monetary Union can be regarded as milestones in the process of 
establishing - in Rokkanian terms - a European ‘community of trust’ (Moreno, 
2003). 
 
 
Subsidiarity, Cosmopolitan Localism and Partner Regions 
 
The principle of subsidiarity enshrined in the Treaty on European Union of 1992 
(Maastricht Treaty) implies that decisions be taken supra-nationally only if local, 
regional or national levels cannot perform better. In other words, the preferred 
locus of decision-making is as decentralized and close to the citizen as 
possible. Political elites within EU member states, reluctant to further the 
process of European institutionalization, interpreted the subsidiarity principle as 
a safeguard for the preservation of traditional national sovereignty and, 
consequently, the powers to intervene centrally. They have been keen to place 
the bottom-line of subsidiarity at the level of the nation-state, not further below 
(van Hecke, 2003). 
 
Social insurance and fiscal policies which have great repercussions for social 
policy have largely remained as national, centrally-run functions. From a 
European and global perspective, however, the decentralization of economic 
development policies has gone hand in hand with the decentralization of 
political institutions and the regionalization of welfare development. Sub-state 
layers of government have found in the principle of European subsidiarity a 
renewed impulse for the running of public affairs, and new opportunities for 
policy experimentation. There is certainly a case for sub-state units to become 
‘laboratories of democracy’. John Donahue has claimed that the payoff from 
innovation exceeds the advantages of uniformity and has underlined policy 
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diffusion as a criterion: the greater the need for innovation (for example, a ‘new’ 
problem or solution), the greater is the rationale for that function to be provided 
by the sub-national (sub-state) government (Donahue, 1997). 
 
Many signs seem to point towards the rise of a European type of cosmopolitan 
localism (Moreno, 2004), which should be regarded in quite a distinct fashion 
from that prescribed in North America for local communities (Etzioni, 1993). In 
the case of the United States, many of the communitarian experiences may be 
regarded as reactions to specific social cleavages and pressing social fractures 
(the criminalization of social life), as instrumental means of socialization in 
response to urban constriction (suburban isolationism), or as alternative 
lifestyles to dominant values (possessive individualism). In this respect, North-
American communitarianism can primarily be seen as socially defensive.15 
 
Such European cosmopolitan localism mainly concerns medium-sized 'meso-
communities' - within or outwith the framework of a state - and is based on 
‘project identities’ characterized in many instances by pro-active attitudes.16 In 
the old continent, it can be detected in small nation-states (Denmark, Ireland, 
Luxembourg), stateless minority nations (Basque Country, Wallonia, Wales), 
but also in regions (Brussels, Languedoc, Lombardy) and big conurbations 
(Berlin, London, Madrid). These meso-communities are spatially situated in a 
somewhat equidistant position between the nation-state, transnational regional 
bodies (APEC, EU, MERCOSUR, NAFTA), and other international frameworks 
(GATT, IMF, OECD, WB, WTO). Territorial identities associated with these 
communities have provided new political underpinnings for citizens and groups. 
Arguably, some ‘small’ nation-states, which are already integrated in 
transnational contexts of governance, especially the EU, and which have ‘lost’ 
significant powers as former ‘small’ sovereign unitary states, might also be 
included in the meso-level category by virtue of their population size and their 
societal homogeneity (for example, Finland, Ireland, or Luxembourg).17 
 
Europeanization has also encouraged intergovernmental co-operation on the 
assumption that national states will be less ‘sovereign’ than they have been up 
until now. Beyond this analytical framework, however, the role of sub-state 
territories is largely neglected in institutional terms. Illustrative of this lack of 
political impulse is the case of the ‘partner regions’, or ‘regions with legislative 
powers’, and the workings of the European Convention on the Future of Europe. 
 
In 2002, about half of the EU-15 regions were ‘partner regions’, or regions with 
legislative powers (in almost half of the member states). With the forthcoming 
enlargement of the EU, a considerable number of small nations will gain status 
as full member states in contrast with large sub-state regions and nations 
without ‘sovereign’ powers.18 This will create a situation in which entities with a 
few thousand inhabitants are entitled to be independently represented in EU 
institutions, as well as having their language recognized as an official language. 
By contrast, historic regions with several million inhabitants, which make a 
major contribution to the economic dynamism of the Union and to the funding of 
its budget, would still be unrecognized by the European treaties (European 
Parliament, 2002). Along the same lines, the Committee of the Regions made a 
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specific reference to those regions with legislative powers which were regarded 
as not being genuinely accountable to their own citizens.19 
 
 
Decentralization and Multi-Tier Governance 
 
As a result of within-state variations, often reflected in different party systems, 
channels of elite representation and interest articulation, decentralization has 
become a major embedding factor in contemporary political life in Europe. Not 
all processes of decentralization are born equal, but in some countries (for 
example, Belgium, Italy or Spain) they are affecting the very ‘core’ of traditional 
social policies. In those countries, health care, for instance, has been 
decentralized in various degrees and manners allowing the establishment of 
regional systems of health provision (see chapters included in this book). These 
three countries have systems of social insurance funded nationally on a 
contributory basis. All three countries have constitutional provisions for the 
universalization of health care, and social insurance legislation has remained a 
competence of the central state, although policy implementation is largely 
regionalized. While in Belgium, Flemish nationalists have called for the 
decentralization and regionalization of the national social security system, in 
Italy and Spain, regional policy implementation has so far allowed for a great 
deal of autonomy in the direction of management (with cost-sharing measures 
in the case of the former). As in other policy areas, financial arrangements for 
the funding of decentralized health policies are of the utmost importance and 
need to be closely assessed on determining the scope of decentralization.  
 
In the era of globalization, on the other hand, the management of sub-state 
welfare regimes emerging as a consequence of decentralization may 
necessitate an intensification of intergovernmental relations, inhibiting not only 
sub-state autonomy but also restraining national and supranational vertical 
‘interference’. Such intergovernmental relations need not be confined to the 
national state. Within the European Union, there is increasing co-operation 
between sub-state regions across states. EU institutions, particularly the 
Parliament, have encouraged multilateral co-operation on the assumption that 
nation-states will be less ‘sovereign’ than they have been up until now. The 
European Commission has also promoted regional development, and EU 
structural funds have opened up new development opportunities and additional 
resources to sub-state regions and nations within decentralized political 
systems.  
 
The European Union is itself developing a role in social policy, evident in 
initiatives such as the Social Chapter of the Treaty on European Union and the 
Working Time Directive limiting the maximum weekly hours EU citizens may be 
expected to work. The development of social policy within and beyond the state 
compels state and sub-state governments alike to manage welfare systems 
within a multi-tiered polity. Streamlining open methods of coordination,20 as has 
so far been the case of the national action plans on employment and social 
inclusion, can be the bases for working out tripartite contracts. These 
governmental agreements, objective-based and drawn up by the Commission, 
member states and regions, are but one of the intergovernmental policy 
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collaborations in which all partners concerned could participate in the three 
phases of the decision-making process: planning of measures, decision-making 
and programme monitoring. 
 
At the supranational level, EU institutions can develop initiatives and take 
actions as a result of ‘spillovers’ from the process of macro-economic reforms 
framed by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability Pact. Member states 
increasingly need to adjust their political ‘sovereignty’ in welfare matters to the 
requirements of the single market. Furthermore, social cohesion has become a 
common goal to be accomplished and preserved within and among all member 
states.21 
 
Such measures of constitutional design are of prime importance in the 
restructuring of welfare arrangements. Frameworks of solidarity as those 
provided by the national systems of social insurance, or those affected by 
European directives, will continue to play a crucial role. However, sensitive 
areas of citizens’ concern where a more efficient policy provision is plausible by 
means of a more effective development of community-orientated services are 
increasingly important. Of particular relevance are those concerned with the 
weaving of ‘safety nets’ to combat poverty and social exclusion. Such areas of 
social intervention appear suitable to be run by elected sub-state layers of 
government, which can be accountable for the implementation of means-tested 
programmes, and for purposes of optimising economies of scale (Moreno, 
2003).  
 
 
Social Rights and Law Enforcement 
 
Among the various factors affecting an observable trend towards ‘unity’ in social 
policy provision developed by the European member states, we must account 
for macro-structural constraints such as external social dumping, industrial 
relocation and financial globalization. But European institutional inputs are also 
important, particularly those related to European law and to the jurisprudence of 
European Court of Justice.  
 
Early European treaties provided the EC legislator with the competence to 
harmonize provisions of national systems of social security in order to secure 
the freedom of movement of workers. Accordingly, the impact of European law 
on social security matters is growing in importance and has potentially far-
reaching consequences. In recent times, social policy matters have been 
brought to the forefront of EU interests. The Social Charter on the right of 
workers, as well as the agreement on social policy within the Maastricht Treaty 
and its inclusion in the Amsterdam Treaty as a separate chapter on social 
policy, have meant significant steps in the direction of developing a ‘Social 
Europe’.  
 
A decisive institutional input shaping the future of social security in the 
European Union is constituted by jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Justice. The European Court of Justice has used its authority to impose 
requirements upon member states, for example, to ensure their social policies 
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are compatible with labour mobility objectives and to secure entitlements to 
health care and social security for EU citizens throughout the Union. Arguably, 
and as a consequence of regulations sustained by European Court rulings since 
the 1980s, European welfare states have transformed from sovereign to ‘semi-
sovereign’ systems (Leibfried and Pierson, 1995).  
 
Two rulings by the European Court concerning core competences of the 
national welfare state can illustrate the extent to which judicial inputs are 
‘Europeanizing’ social policy-making. In the 1993 Poucet-Pistre case,22 the 
Court ruled that citizens cannot abandon their compulsory national insurance 
systems on the basis of Europe’s freedom of service. The ruling upheld the 
compulsory nature of national systems of public insurance and the principle of 
redistributive solidarity among the diverse income groups and age groups 
integrated within them. According to this ruling, the principles of obligatory 
social insurance and public monopoly do conform to the four freedoms 
enshrined in the European Treaty.  
 
The decision of 1998 on the Kohll and Decker23 cases constituted a turning 
point in the juridical concept of the relation between EU law and national health 
insurance laws. The Court ruled that, in the absence of harmonization at the EU 
level, each member state could determine the conditions concerning the right 
and duty to be insured with a social security scheme, as well as for the 
establishment of the conditions for entitlement to benefits. Nevertheless, and 
this was the crucial aspect of the Court’s decision, member states should 
comply with European law when exercising their powers to organize their social 
security systems, and should reimburse the costs involved. In this sense, the 
Kohll and Dekker rulings constitute important judicial decisions for the 
neutralization of territoriality conditions in EU health care systems (Kötter, 1999; 
Pennings, 2001). 
 
Until now, decisions and rulings by the Court have enjoyed an uncontested 
degree of legitimacy vis-à-vis national interests defended by the governments of 
the member states. At the root of such an attitude lies the acceptance not only 
that political life in Europe depends upon the rule of law, but also that rights and 
values are eventually to be corroborated by Court decisions.  
 
 
The European Social Model 
 
Despite the diversity of its institutional forms and manifestations, the European 
social model can be identified as one based upon collective solidarity and as 
the result of patterns of social conflict and co-operation in contemporary times. 
During the twentieth century, the rise of the welfare state - a European 
‘invention’- meant states could meet the basic needs of ‘the people’, through the 
provision of income security, health care, housing and education. There is a 
widespread belief that the ‘European social model’ provides collective unity and 
identity to most EU countries, in contrast to other systems, especially the United 
States model, where individualization is a distinctive tenet for welfare provision (a 
belief, incidentally, which is also attached to the Canadian welfare system). The 
articulation of ‘floors’ or ‘nets’ of legal rights and material resources for citizens to 
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participate actively in society can be seen as a common primary concern of 
European member states. Accordingly, the fight against poverty and social 
exclusion plays a central role in the European social model.  
 
As viewed from below, the ‘European social model’ appears much more diverse 
as a kaleidoscope of sediments and peculiarities, although sharing a common 
perspective on social risks’ coverage and the promotion of social citizenship 
(Flora, 1993). Indeed, the systems of social protection within the European 
Union are far from being identical and uniform (Scharpf, 2002). Any future 
scenario for unified EU involvement in the area of policies regarding social 
protection must take into account the present situation of welfare peculiarities 
(Kuhnle, 2000; Pierson, 2001; Taylor-Gooby, 2001). 
 
As viewed from above, there has been in recent years a widening in the forms of 
welfare provision and, indeed, an expansion of supplementary forms of market 
insurance. Relevant actors, such as insurance companies, provident funds or 
mutual societies, are bound to become relevant actors alongside trade unions or 
business and professional associations (Ferrera, 2003; see also Ferrera’s chapter 
in this volume). 
 
The accommodation of cleavage structures, often forged over centuries, 
appears to be a pre-requisite to any political attempt to dismantle internal 
boundaries in a supra-national Europe. The development of a European supra-
national welfare system is, therefore, unlikely in the near future. In promoting 
welfare development, national and local cultures will continue to play a crucial 
role in peoples’ expectations, perceptions and values. This area of social policy-
making is highly shaped by local cultures and lifestyles, and is less likely to be 
dealt with in a homogenous and centralized manner from a supra-national 
entity. However, in the second half of the 1990s, there were renewed attempts 
to optimize the building of a Social Europe, resting on a virtuous combination of 
sub-state, nation-state and supranational programmes and regulations.  
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The relationship between social policy and territorial politics has generally been 
under-theorized and under-examined. There is a large literature on regionalism, 
mainly focused on political economy questions, the decentralization of 
government, and the question of ‘governance’. The problem of territorial equity 
and cohesion has been mentioned frequently in discussions of the ‘new 
regionalism’ (Keating, 1998), but there has been little focus on the 
regionalization of the welfare state.  
 
When analysing functional and territorial changes we often acknowledge 
ambivalences and even apparent contradictions. With regard to the process of 
Europeanization, for instance, the study of the link between changes in the 
institutional profile of European welfare states and changes in the cleavage and 
centre-periphery structures is a very promising front for future empirical 
research and theory in comparative social policy. If new economic policies have 
allowed for monetary centralization and a growing harmonization of single-
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market policies, a generalization of the quest for policy decentralization also 
points at a political redistribution of powers in multi-tiered Europe (Ferrera, 
2003; Moreno and Palier, 2004). 
  
The welfare/territory comparative field of research has a great potential and will 
no doubt increase academic interest not only within the discipline of political 
science, but from other disciplinary quarters of the social sciences. Political 
actors and institutions, economic variables, sociological categories and 
historical trends are but a few of the areas to be analysed. The existence of a 
diversity of interpretations does not entail that the different theories and 
approaches are incompatible: social phenomena are not ‘coherent’ or ‘uniform’. 
Rather, they are diverse and generally develop within mutually interdependent 
and interacting structures. 
 
In this introductory chapter, we have conceptually explored the relationship 
between territorial politics and welfare development. We have tried to refrain 
ourselves from ‘packing’ too many concepts and ideas, and are aware of the 
limitations of our analyses and discussions. It would have been unrealistic to 
attempt to cover the many conceptual categories involved in the examination of 
this welfare and territory inter-relationship. The main distinctions we have 
sought to address have dealt with state formation, the welfare state and 
nationhood, and the influence of state structure on welfare development in the 
light of the internal quest for decentralization and the external constraints of 
globalization. Welfare retrenchment as a containment of public spending and 
marketization of social needs, and its territorial implications, has also focused 
our attention, together with the impact of Europeanization and the prospects of 
a multi-tiered provision of European welfare, which would incorporate regional, 
nation-state and supranational layers of government. An emphasis in 
comparative analyses is the reflection of a concern for making sense of the 
various territorial developments and institutional routes taken by the state as an 
arena for welfare solidarity. We have explored this mainly in theoretical terms. 
The empirical studies in the chapters which follow provide further insight into the 
territorial politics of welfare.* 
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NOTES 
 
1. Note that in Wilhelmine Germany, social insurance institutions were established prior to 
political rights (Flora and Alber, 1981). 
2. According to T. H. Marshall (1950), the three stages in the evolution of modern citizenship run 
in parallel with the various periods of the constitutional recognition of rights; (a) civil, during the 
eighteenth century related to the demise of the estate society of the Ancien Regime after the 
English, American and French Revolutions; (b) political, during the nineteenth century with the 
institutionalization of both democratic liberalism and electoral representation; and (c) social, 
during the twentieth century with the consolidation of egalitarianism in the welfare industrial 
democracies. 
3. The example of Spain is illustrative. In all seventeen Spanish Comunidades Autónomas (sub-
state regions and nationalities), there is a high proportion of citizens who claim some form of 
dual self-identification. The question addressed to them in successive polls has been as follows: 
‘In general, would you say that you feel...(1) ‘Only Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, etc.’; (2) ‘More 
Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, etc. than Spanish’; (3) ‘As much Andalusian, Basque, Catalan as 
Spanish’; (4) ‘More Spanish than Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, etc.’; or (5) ‘Only Spanish’. In 
the period October 1990-June 1995 a degree of duality was expressed by around 70 per cent of 
the total Spanish population (that is, categories 2, 3 and 4) (Moreno, 2001: 110-126). In the 
case of Scotland/United Kingdom, surveys using a similar scale were first carried out in the mid-
1980s (Moreno, 1986: 439-441). 
4. When Walker Connor analysed the composition of the 132 states which made up the United 
Nations in 1971, he concluded that only 12 of these were nation-states in which the political unit 
coincided with the national community. By 1984, he could describe only seven states as nation-
states in the strict sense of the term (Connor, 1994). These included Denmark, Iceland, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal. 
5. Or non-governmental as in the case of the quango - quasi-autonomous non-governmental-
organization- a body established and appointed by the government. It can also refer to ‘private-
sector’ bodies carrying out functions on the government's behalf. In either case, they are not 
directly accountable to users of the services they provide, but to the institutions that appoint 
their members, allowing a great deal of ‘behind-the-scenes’ negotiations and arrangements. 
6. However, Eugen Weber (1976) pointed out that in 1870 the great majority of inhabitants in 
French rural areas and small municipalities did not regard themselves as members of the 
French nation. This perception of ‘non-belonging’ lasted until the first world war. Military 
conscription and warfare among European states was a major factor for the consolidation of the 
processes of nation-building in the old continent (Tilly, 1975). 
7. Cooperative federalism puts forward the idea that intergovernmental relations should be 
based on collaboration. Such practices - labelled at times as tortuous or ‘joint-trap decision’ 
mechanisms - aim at maximizing administrative interdependence and are better suited to 
countries with political cultures grounded on values of pact, negotiation and tolerance 
(Duchacek, 1970). In the case of Germany, and its Bundestreue, or federal mutual trust, 
cooperative practices are in line with a high degree of internal ethno-territorial homogeneity 
(Manow, 2005). 
8. After the 1993 state reform, article 1 of the Belgian Constitution proclaimed that, ‘Belgium is a 
federal state, composed of communities and regions’. These two types of member states 
(communities and regions) partly overlap territorially, a fact from which much of the complexity 
of the Belgian federal state derives. 
9. At that time, it reigned over Piedmont and Sardinia. Piedmontese political leaders, such as 
Cavour, were decisive in bringing together into one unitary state other territories and reigns of 
the Italian peninsula (that is, the RC state, the reign of the Two Sicilies, and other areas under 
the direct or indirect control of the Austrian Empire). 
10. By which there was a compromise between a primary framework of property ownership and 
social rights in advanced industrial countries representative of welfare capitalism. This mutual 
concession made feasible the institutionalization of conflicts latent between capitalist 
inequalities and equalities derived from mass citizenship and allowed for the solidarity principle 
upon which the post-war welfare state was constructed (Rhodes and Mény, 1998; Crouch, 
1999). 
11. This approach is criticized on the ground that the only areas of ongoing welfare expansion 
(services for working mothers, older people) are the least related to globalization. An exception 
to this general trend may be active labour market policies (Bonoli, 2002). 
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12. In the United States, after examining federal expenditures over 30 years, Peterson (1995) 
concluded that legislative federalism helps to understand why some elements of functional 
federalism, such as redistribution, have been so difficult to achieve. 
13. On analyzing the effect of two federal grant programmes in the United States, Chubb (1985) 
found the exact opposite of what economists predicted because the political factors affected the 
oversight and ultimately the overall spending. 
14. By combining these two dimensions, namely the object of Europeanization, and its 
understanding as a process and as an outcome, four distinct meanings of the term can be 
identified as follows; (i) Europeanization as competence shift from the national level on decision-
making to the European one; (ii) Europeanization as policy convergence across member states 
in a particular policy area, (iii) Europeanization as an adaptive response of national institutions 
to the impact and imperatives of European intervention; and (iv) Europeanization as institutional 
convergence in the governance systems of member countries (Colino, 1997). 
15. Other functional identities linked to various dimensions of social life, such as cultural forms, 
gender, religion and individual sociobiological conditions can also be interpreted as new forms 
of ‘resistance’ (Kilminster, 1997). 
16. According to Manuel Castells (1997) ‘project identities’ do not seem to originate from the old 
identities of the civil societies in the Industrial Age, but from the development of current 
‘resistance identities’ against the informational avalanche. This argument is rather circular as 
regards its territorial dimension. In the case of the United States, sub-state spatial identities are 
not commensurable with the type of collective identities deeply rooted in the Volkgeist of the 
diverse European peoples. 
17. The ‘No’ result in the Danish Referendum to ratify the Maastricht Treaty in June 1992, as 
well as the ‘Yes’ ratification of the same Treaty with opt-outs in a similar referendum held on 
May 1993, can be regarded as expressions of the unease of this ‘small and homogeneous’ 
European state in the face of the loss of traditional sovereign powers. The negative outcome of 
the Referendum on the Nice Treaty held in Ireland in June 2001 may also be interpreted, among 
other considerations, as a refusal to endorse fiscal harmonization within the EU and a fear 
about future majority voting by EU decision-making institutions. However, the subsequent 
referendum of October 2002 produced a clear pro-EU result. 
18. Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Slovenia have populations of 750,000; 
1,370,000, 1,375,000; 2,375,000, 391,000 and 2,000,000 inhabitants, respectively. Such 
populations make a sharp contrast with some ‘partner regions’ as North Rhine Westphalia (17 
million), Lombardy (9 million) or Andalusia (7.5 million). 
19. It made reference to the regions in Finland (the Åland Islands), Belgium (3 regions, 3 
communities), Germany (16 Länder), Austria (9 Länder), Spain (17 Comunidades Autónomas), 
Portugal (2 autonomous regions), Italy (20 regioni and 2 autonomous provinces), and the United 
Kingdom (3 parliaments, or regional assemblies) (Committee of the Regions, 2002). 
20. Or OMC, an acronym coined at the time of the Portuguese Presidency in 2000, which seeks 
to establish common guidelines, joint evaluation, peer reviews and recommendations involving 
member states' stakeholders and relevant policy actors. Even in the absence of ‘hard’ EU 
regulations and sanctions, the Open Method of Coordination aims at providing an incentive for 
compliance on the side of state and sub-state governments (Ferrera et al., 2002). 
21. The reference to social cohesion has been included in the Single European Act (as the 
article number 130a already indicates), and there is a chapter on social policy (art. 117- 122) 
which calls upon member states to cooperate for the improvement of working and living 
conditions (art. 117). 
22. These two French citizens appealed to the European Court after having been denied their 
expressed option of paying their social contributions to a private scheme instead of the 
compulsory social insurance. The ruling established that such a national requirement did not 
infringe the provisions of the Treaty regarding either the provisions of the freedom of services 
and on the abuse of dominant position. 
23. Mr. Kohll, a Luxembourg citizen, had requested the authorization for dental treatment of his 
daughter in Germany (Trier). Mr. Decker, also a Luxembourg citizen, had solicited the 
reimbursement of spectacles with corrective lenses he had purchased in Belgium. In both 
cases, national social security administrations rejected both claims. Kohll and Decker appealed 
subsequently to the European Court of Justice. 
 
* The authors are grateful to Keith Banting for comments on an earlier version of this chapter. 
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